Delusional disorder (DD) is still considered a diagnosis of exclusion for a difficult-to-treat condition characterised by the presence of delusional beliefs in the absence of other psychiatric symptoms. Attempts to contextualise psychological processes recognised since the earliest observations of this disorder have had very limited impact on improving some fixed beliefs. In the Cambridge Early Intervention in Psychosis Service we have observed a particular phenomenon, often categorised as a delusional idea in the context of DD, which manifests through highly repetitive belief expression that fails to respond to pharmacological and psychological treatments. Key aspects of this phenomenon are similar to those observed in dissociative (functional neurological) presentations. Drawing on the Integrative Cognitive Model of functional neurological disorders, we developed a successful psychological intervention that places less emphasis on challenging delusional content and focuses more on dismantling dissociation and underlying affective factors associated with the activation of the fixed belief. Our initial findings reinforce the need to continue developing a multi-level phenomenological approach to define a variety of symptoms traditionally grouped under the concept of "delusion."
Introduction
In describing cases with unshakeable delusional beliefs in a context of otherwise unremarkable cognitive functioning and affective states, Emil Kraepelin (1856 Kraepelin ( -1926 made a distinction between "paranoia"/delusional disorder (DD) and dementia praecox (schizophrenia) which focused on underlying psychological processes [1, 2] . The attention biases and personality dimensions that formed the 19th century aetiology of DD were left out of ongoing attempts to classify the disorder [3] , as diagnostic manuals gradually overlooked previous perspectives on the psychological aspects of DD [2] .
DD is still considered a diagnosis of exclusion with key criteria referring to the presence of delusional beliefs in the absence of other psychiatric symptoms [2] . Individuals with this disorder continue to be classified by delusional content and placed within schizophrenia spectrum disorders [3] ; their treatment still relies on medication, mostly antipsychotics. Many psychiatric interventions now rely on single level etiological explanations (e.g., neurotransmitter abnormalities), which assume that DD and other psychotic disorders are underpinned by the same underlying mechanisms. In so doing, they overlook important environmental, psychological, and biological factors that distinguish different clinical phenomena and have distinct implications for treatment [4] . Interest in the components of psychosis is gaining ground amid the developing understanding that conditions such as schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorders, and DDs may not share as many phenomenological commonalities as currently thought [5] .
Psychological interventions for psychosis have evolved out of ground-breaking cognitive models of positive symptoms, such as Garety et al.'s [6] , which broadly agree that delusions are causal inferences developed to explain affective, perceptual, and cognitive anomalies [7] . The Cognitive Behaviour Therapy for psychosis (CBTp) currently used in clinical practice [8] is based on these models. It focuses on symptom modification, using cognitive challenging and reality testing to tackle attributional and reasoning bias linked to formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs, and managing affect and associated stressors in order to develop sufficient therapeutic alliance to tackle the delusional content [9] [10] [11] . This therapeutic approach has proved to be effective in psychotic disorders, but evidence on its specific usefulness for DD is still limited; DD remains a difficult-to-treat condition [10, 11] .
Recent CBTp evolutions, driven by a causal-interventionist approach [5] , may enable effective treatment when insight into presenting symptoms is poor; a defining feature of DD. Freeman's multifactorial model for the treatment of persecutory delusions [5] targets factors hypothesised as being associated with the formation and maintenance of the delusion, i.e., worry, negative self-beliefs, safety behaviours, anomalous experience, sleep dysfunction, and reasoning bias, and not the delusion itself. However, despite these advances there is still a significant number of patients with persistent delusions who do not improve with this approach [12, 13] .
In our Early Intervention in Psychosis Service in Cambridge, UK (http://www.cameo.nhs.uk), we have observed patients with a particular phenomenon, often classified as a delusional idea in the context of DD, characterised by highly repetitive belief expression that resembles dissociative (functional neurological) presentations and fails to respond to pharmacological and psychological treatment. Herewith, we summarise the cases of two patients displaying this phenomenon. We suggest a mechanistic hypothesis to explain its formation and maintenance, supported by the therapeutic usefulness of a cognitive model and interventions usually employed in functional neurological disorders (FND).
Description of the Phenomenon

Case 1
A 46-year-old woman, S., was referred with a fixed belief about having transgressed at work, accompanied by repeated complaining about feeling bad to work colleagues. S. found that she was quite unable to stop herself talking about this in a highly repetitive manner: "It is just [pause] I've lied to everyone. I've done a bad thing. I have let myself down." Expression of the belief was accompanied by strong negative affect (frustration and crying). This in turn induced further expression of the belief, punctuated by periods of normal functioning.
S. had a history of periods of anxiety and low mood occurring in response to events when she perceived she had made a serious social transgression; these were experienced by her as traumatic. The development of the fixed belief appeared to follow a short period of sick leave for which S. had not given the true reason for her absence. A diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive disorder was ruled out (see below). Medication changes had been frequent due to variability in symptoms and she exhibited difficulties with metacognitive thinking, particularly in identifying and interpreting thoughts or emotions. This precluded the use of techniques such as cognitive restructuring or reality testing, meaning that psychological therapy had had little impact on the beliefs or on her mental state. Indeed, focusing on affect or thought processes would quickly lead into expression of the fixed belief and associated repetitive speech. Her job and, therefore, her home were at risk due to the ongoing symptoms. S. was continuing to work, but this was increasingly interrupted by crises when her beliefs would become highly activated. On most occasions, staff found they were able to support S. in managing the belief activation by distracting her with physical activity, such as getting up to make a cup of tea, and also changing the subject to a neutral one, such as hobbies. Once distracted, the affect would disappear and S. was able to engage in conversation without difficulty. The belief would then eventually be re-triggered and the affect immediately return, accompanied by repetitive speech until distracted again. As work and work relationships became more strained, the fixed belief became difficult to interrupt and eventually chronically activated. This led to high levels of distress, depression secondary to the fixed belief, and some instances of memory lapses and apparent confusion, which were put down to low mood and anxiety. An inpatient admission was required, plus frequent on-going crises managed by our team in the community.
Case 2
A 44-year-old woman, D., developed a fixed belief that she had brain damage and could not sleep and that this had been caused by her husband giving her a half-tablet of anxiolytic medication prescribed by her GP. Two years earlier, she had developed concerns that she had an acquired brain injury after a relatively minor head trauma with no loss of consciousness, but had eventually been reassured following neurological investigation at the local hospital. Prior to that, there was a history of health anxiety and tendency to somatise which had become worse after the sudden death of her father, although she always denied any difficulty with this loss.
The presenting belief was strongly triggered by being in her home and by interaction with her husband and accompanied by strong negative affect and repeated phrases, "[Pause] My brain's dying. I can't survive with no sleep. The tablet blocked the nerves from my brain to my body!" The belief expression, repetitive speech, and accompanying affect seemed to quickly resolve through a change of environment, but resumed when engaged in conversation about illness or faced with responsibility in the home environment. The fixed belief began after a phobic reaction to planned dental treatment. D. had found it difficult to recover from panic attacks associated with this and the fixed belief developed shortly after being given an anxiolytic prescribed by the GP to manage these symptoms. Additionally, there was ongoing pressure due to difficulties in her marriage, including an antagonistic relationship between D. and her husband, who was very critical of D's role in the family. Her relationship with her husband and two young children was under considerable strain. D. was experiencing high levels of distress that coincided with times when her beliefs became chronically activated; depression secondary to the belief expression exacerbated this. This led to five inpatient admissions, where the distress would quickly dissipate once admitted, and regular crisis management at home. D.'s condition was initially resistant to treatment with medication. When taken regularly, a combination of antipsychotic and antidepressant medication had some limited effectiveness in dampening her symptoms. Difficulties with metacognitive thinking limited the scope of psychological therapy. Attempts to engage her in this or in monitoring affect were usually interrupted by triggering of the belief and repetitive speech.
In both cases a diagnosis of DD was made, with the phenomenon described meeting current DSM-5 criteria for "delusion": a false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality despite what almost everyone believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary [14] . However, the fixed beliefs displayed by these patients had in common some distinctive key features; for example, they were (a) episodic, (b) expressed in a highly repetitive manner, and (c) characterised by very specific content, using identical words and phrases, delivered in the same order each time they were disclosed. The term "utterances" was used to describe this speech because both patients were unable to explain any meaning to their words; encouragement to explore this led to further emphatic repetition of the utterances. When the beliefs were disclosed, the utterances were accompanied by high levels of expressed affect, usually anger or frustration, which always emerged in the same manner, giving it a stereotyped quality. Both utterances and affect dissipated rapidly when distracted, allowing periods of recovery when there was no evidence of psychiatric illness other than affective symptoms secondary to the belief. Despite the distress that was caused by these beliefs, they were not perceived as anomalous and were, in both cases, accepted and defended as reality. Any direct challenge to their beliefs was experienced as invalidating and this led to feelings of hopelessness. The level of activation of the beliefs appeared to be moderated by affect, becoming more activated at times when events led to increased negative affect.
The beliefs persisted, despite numerous hospital admissions, intensive support, and attempts at treatment using medication and psychological approaches. Both patients tried several different combinations of antipsychotics and antidepressants before some partial stress reduction was achieved. Early attempts at psychological therapy were limited by the beliefs being accepted and defended as reality. Therapeutic work aimed at associated factors, such as worry [5, 12] , was problematic due to an apparent difficulty for both patients in understanding and thinking about psychological constructs, such as thoughts and emotions, regardless of whether or not the beliefs were actively being expressed. There was little evidence of difficulty in functioning beyond the immediate impact of the beliefs. Each case had some historical problems with anxiety or mood, but no previous contact with mental health services.
Phenomenological Distinctiveness
Some potential phenomenological overlaps were considered and, ultimately, excluded. For instance, obsessive-compulsive phenomena present some similarities with the clinical manifestations we observed in both cases, such as the seemingly ritualistic nature of the utterances. Obsessive thoughts are usually recognised as unwanted [15] . On the contrary, S. and D. did not experience their thoughts as anomalous; they may have had a distressing impact, but were accepted and defended entirely as reality. In addition, the onset of obsessive-compulsive symptoms in mid-life is relatively rare and usually thought to be associated with organic changes [16] . Depressive rumination was also excluded due to the lack of any clinical evidence suggesting affective disorder or symptoms beyond those secondary to the manifestation of the aforementioned beliefs. "Perseveration," defined as repeating or prolonging an action, thought, or utterance, may resemble the phenomenon observed; however, perseverations still persist when stimuli that may trigger the automatic response are absent or have ceased [17] . Furthermore, perseverations, stereotypies, and other automatisms usually appear at later stages of more severe, longlasting psychotic psychopathology [18] . With regard to other possible psychotic disorder diagnoses, such as Psychopathology 2019;52:50-58 DOI: 10.1159/000499596 schizophrenia, the age of onset was later than is usual for schizophrenia and, in addition, neither case presented with psychotic symptoms other than non-bizarre fixed beliefs [14] .
Definition of the Phenomenon and a Mechanistic Hypothesis
The phenomenon described above seems to appear in response to triggers that automatically activate a cognitive/behavioural programme, the content of which determines the theme of the belief and associated behaviours. This then runs in a perseverative fashion until the activation level can be brought down. We have observed that these disturbances occur in otherwise normal functioning and are episodic. They are not considered to be the result of willed action and are thought to be triggered by affect and learned associated factors. Understood in this way, these particular features suggest that we may be encountering a compartmentalised dissociative phenomenon which is characterised by highly repetitive belief expression and associated utterances. Given the way it manifests, this phenomenon could be called a "Dissociative Thought-Script" (DT-S).
Phenomena associated with dissociative compartmentalisation are defined as being those in which individuals lose the ability to control processes of actions they would usually have volitional control over [19] ; the effect is reversible, but not through conscious effort. Apart from being inaccessible to volitional control, the compartmentalised processes continue to function in a normal manner, influencing ongoing emotion, cognition, and action in a way that is experienced by the individual as intuitively correct; they are perceived and defended as reality [19] . Compartmentalised phenomena are found in FND, including somatoform symptoms, such as convulsions and paralysis, and in a variety of psychoform symptoms, such as amnesia, flashbacks, or pseudohallucinations [20] . A qualitatively different type of dissociation, "detachment," sometimes co-exists with compartmentalised phenomena and is identified as being an altered state of consciousness in which individuals describe a sense of separation from aspects of everyday experience [19] .
Dissociative processes have not yet been specifically incorporated and described in CBTp techniques, although there are clinical and theoretical reasons to assume they play some role in the development and maintenance of symptoms [7] . [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . This model sought to clarify the role of cognitive, psychodynamic, and dissociative processes known to be associated with FND and medically unexplained symptoms by integrating them within a single explanatory framework. The ICM recognises that dissociative symptoms may occur in the absence of any obvious psychopathology and provides an explanatory model that does not rely on concepts of early adversity or psychiatric disturbance [22] . This model is useful to understand how subjective experience and volitional control are generated by the cognitive system and models what happens when both experience and control appear to break down [21] . These features indicate that the ICM may also provide a useful mechanistic framework for DT-S.
Dissociative Thought-Scripts as a Result of "Rogue Representations"
The ICM proposes that awareness and action can be distorted by compartmentalised material. In the ICM, compartmentalisation results from any chronically active mental representation that is inconsistent with information coming from the senses, with the nature of the presenting symptoms depending on the underlying representation [20] . As such, FND can be thought of as distortions of consciousness.
A central feature of the ICM is that distortions of consciousness are part of everyday experience, often due to prior expectations about what is happening around us [22] (e.g., when we think our mobile phone is vibrating, but it is not, or the well-documented effect of placebo treatment). Prior expectations can also cause errors in our behaviour, such as dialling an out-of-date phone number or getting in the wrong side of the car after driving in another country. Prior expectation is formed via information in memory which plays a key role in what we experience and what we do [20] . The ICM aims to provide an account of how stored information in the cognitive system influences the contents of conscious awareness [20] and assumes that sense data automatically activate several predictions or hypotheses about the input within memory systems. Sensory information is then combined with the most active hypothesis to produce a working representation.
This "best-guess" interpretation corresponds to the contents of conscious awareness and provides a basis for DOI: 10.1159/000499596 further processing and action via a hierarchical network of behavioural programs that are triggered automatically when a threshold activation level is reached. The process is preconscious and is experienced by the individual as intuitive [20, 23] . This system is good at enabling us to interpret and respond quickly to events via our prior experience. Usually, sensation and experience match because our pre-conscious predictions about the world tend to be accurate [23] . Deliberate reflection on an action would only be required when the behavioural programs in memory are inadequate for the current task, or a habitual response needs to be overridden. For instance, if an incorrect hypothesis achieves highest salience and is selected, the conflict will be picked up via high-level processing and prioritised for awareness, e.g., when we see that we have no steering wheel in front of us, we become aware we are sitting on the wrong side of the car. However, if a hypothesis or memory becomes disproportionately active and not checked due to high-level inhibitory processing dysfunction, it can be inappropriately selected as the "best fit" interpretation. This is called a "rogue representation" [23] . Thus, the central thesis of the ICM is that FND arise as a result of "rogue representations" ("best fit" hypotheses) relating to illness. The same process may apply to the expression of DT-S.
In DT-S, the rogue representation can be seen as a distortion of the source of threat [21] , forming when people cannot process negative emotions and the meaning attached to these, either because they are unable to do so, mostly due to difficulty representing emotional states symbolically, or because it is too threatening for them [23] . The rogue representation becomes a metaphor for the emotional state that cannot be processed. The function of the DT-S is that it interrupts the threat of escalating symptomatic arousal, and triggers may be internal or external stimuli relating to negative affect or associated factors [22] . When an incorrect hypothesis (rogue representation) achieves sufficient salience, the DT-S is initiated automatically and expressed, not in the form of somatic or neurological symptoms, but as utterances associated with a fixed thought/belief.
According to the ICM, rogue representations may be maintained (i.e., not inhibited) because high-level inhibitory processing is compromised for some reason. Evidence suggests that numerous factors can contribute to such a disturbance in inhibitory functioning, with anxiety, depression, stress, traumatisation, and/or emotion dysregulation being particularly important in this regard [22] . Rogue representations may be chronically activated as continuous symptoms, such as dissociative paralysis, or prone to episodic activation, such as psychogenic epileptic seizures and DT-S. The process by which the rogue representation is selected becomes elaborated each time the person experiences behavioural activation of the rogue representation. As the selection of the rogue representation increases its salience, this reinforces the process by which it is selected and potentially can increase the number of cues that trigger attacks over time [23] . In some cases, there may be a protective function to a particular DT-S representation achieving most salience, such as the avoidance of painful/incomprehensible thoughts, aversive memories, or situations, or other emotional material that is too threatening to process [23, 24] (see Fig. 1 and online suppl. material at www.karger.com/ doi/10.1159/000499596).
Therapeutic Approach and Its Usefulness
Through understanding the role of compartmentalisation in the development of the DT-S and using the ICM as a framework to gain a different perspective on the phenomenon and the processes underlying it we were able to re-formulate our clinical approach. In the treatment of FND, the ICM emphasis on routine mental processes provides a psychological account of patients' symptoms that is emotionally neutral [20] . Everyday examples can be used to explain what is happening, showing that there are many examples where experience is inconsistent with what is "really" happening in the world, and illustrating the automatic nature of such behaviour [20] . The application of this model to DT-S may help formulate a normalised psychological account of patients' experiences and supports the move away from direct emphasis on presenting symptoms which, in treating delusions, is usually only partially successful and can be counter-productive [10] .
Our conceptualisation emphasises the role of dissociative compartmentalisation in the formation and maintenance of the DT-S. Through using the ICM to socialise patients to a psychological account, techniques such as guided discovery can be used to develop understanding of the likely origin of their symptoms [20] . The ICM provides an open platform for psychological treatment, meaning a range of psychological therapies or techniques can be employed. Treatment emphasis would lie in factors contributing to the formation of a DT-S (e.g., psychological trauma, developmental factors, problems with managing affect, and the role of compartmentalisation) and its maintenance (e.g., experience of invalidation and conflict when help-seeking leads to its activation). For instance, in post-traumatic stress disorders with dissociative symptoms, addressing emotional dysregulation, such as lack of emotional awareness or strategies for managing emotions, seems to reduce dissociative experiences and assist treatment [25] . In psychosis, when using new CBTp approaches with cases where DT-S are present, understanding the role of dissociative experiences and addressing these may also enhance outcomes.
Our cases, S. and D., had a positive response to this treatment approach. It had good face validity for patients and their families who found the explanation accessible, quickly recognising the process it described. S. and D. found it acceptable because it did not directly challenge their fixed beliefs; instead it acknowledged the presence of the beliefs and looked for the underlying triggers, providing a clear rationale for this. Treatment was realigned to address triggers activating the DT-S and factors underlying its development. Through the new formulation of the psychological process driving their illness, it became possible to engage S. and D. in therapeutic work and maintain more consistent treatment plans. Prior to this, mental health services had been largely limited to crisisrelated work occurring when the DT-S became chronically activated.
Case 1
As outlined above, a number of events experienced as traumatic were formulated as underlying S.'s long-standing social anxiety and episodes of low mood and these, plus an avoidant emotional coping style, may have contributed to the development of the DT-S. The triggering event underlying formation of the DT-S was identified as an experience that raised memories of past psychological trauma associated with high levels of shame and loss and S. found her usual coping style of avoiding emotion was unsustainable. S. took time off work due to this, but was not truthful about the nature of her sick leave and the DT-S achieved salience in the weeks following this. The DT-S was not recognised as anomalous, achieving more salience each time it was activated. Through treatment, it became apparent that periods of confusion previously ascribed to low mood were consistent with the "detachment" type of dissociation. The DT-S had also remained present suggesting that, as observed in some examples of PNES, both compartmentalisation and detachment can co-exist in such cases. Applying the ICM model to formulation S., her family and mental health staff learned about the role of emotional avoidance and dissociative processes, and how to recognise triggers for the DT-S and address these. S. was supported to regain her social life and activities, such as running, which she had previously associated with improved self-esteem. The number of crisis interventions reduced and when crises did occur, staff were able to de-escalate distress quickly and support S. to break the periods of DT-S chronic activation. Once triggers were identified, structured problem-solving was used to support S. in identifying and working with thoughts and to make a plan to address the affective response underlying the DT-S activation. As the number of triggers for negative affect reduced, the DT-S became less activated and S. found metacognitive thinking more accessible. We were then able to begin work on underlying trauma and S.'s emotionally avoidant coping style.
Case 2
The sudden death of D.'s father following a stroke and ensuing health anxiety, involving a tendency to symptom-search on the internet, previous experience of neurological investigation, and a context of on-going significant marital strain were formulated as contributing to the development of the DT-S: the belief that taking a half tablet given to D. by her husband had caused brain damage. D. had an avoidant emotional coping style, often observed as emotionally blunted at times when she might expect to experience distress. The triggering event seemed to have been the phobic reaction to planned dental treatment which led to days of high anxiety and panic attacks. These symptoms did not resolve despite the GP prescribing an anxiolytic and the DT-S seems to have achieved salience at this time, then becoming activated at the threat or experience of negative affect and, as it was not recognised as anomalous, achieving more salience each time.
D. found the formulation validating and understood the model, although she struggled to retain and use this understanding outside therapy appointments without support. Support was given to D.'s husband providing an explanation for her behaviour and possible exits from the DT-S when activated. By using the ICM model, staff found the model an effective way to de-escalate distress when the DT-S was becoming chronically activated. The model was used to acknowledge D.'s distress, and work with her to identify negative affect around health anxiety and close relationships as significant DT-S triggers, and to address these. D.'s hospital admissions ceased as staff learned how to de-escalate DT-S chronic activation and help D. address underlying affect. D. returned to work and although there were on-going difficulties in her marital relationship and associated triggering of her DT-S, it was possible to support D. to manage her distress in the community.
The ICM model was used in both cases to identify and formulate the DT-S presentation. For both D. and S. the trigger was always an external or internal event prompting negative affect or anticipation of it (e.g., talking about work for S., or talking about sleep for D.). Long-standing anxiety traits were reflected in the content of the DT-S. Both patients were observed to have an emotionally avoidant coping style and found psychological thinking a challenge, particularly when the DT-S was activated. This may illustrate the role played by factors such as chronic anxiety or trauma on inhibitory control and the formation and maintenance of compartmentalised phenomena.
Once a DT-S trigger had been identified, we initially employed distraction and structured problem-solving, and, subsequently, cognitive therapy to address this. Interference tasks introduced and supported by staff were most effective, e.g., changing the subject, getting up and making a cup of tea together, or engaging in activity, and reflect distraction and re-focussing techniques (for example sensory grounding, absorbing mental or physical activity) used in managing dissociation [19] . Using distraction or problem-solving to halt negative affect related to proximal events (rather than relatively distal factors that may be underlying formation of the DT-S) provided an interruption to the activation of the DT-S. The fixed beliefs and DT-S remained, but were activated less often and with less intensity as the underlying negative affect was Psychopathology 2019;52:50-58 DOI: 10.1159/000499596 attenuated. Given that both S. and D. found identifying and working with thoughts challenging at times, especially when the DT-S was activated, the scaffolding nature of problem-solving techniques proved helpful in providing a meaningful forward plan. Further treatment goals included developing ways for S. and D. to identify and respond to their respective DT-S without requiring external support and addressing issues underlying the formation of the DT-S.
Conclusion
DD is a difficult-to-treat condition and outcomes tend to be poor. It has become a diagnosis of exclusion defined by the presence of delusional beliefs in the absence of other psychiatric symptoms; thus, both pharmacological and psychological treatments have focussed on the delusional content. New approaches targeting factors associated with the formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs may be limited by the extent to which patients with this diagnosis can engage in therapeutic work. In some DDs, we have observed a phenomenon of repeated expression of fixed beliefs that could be called "Dissociative ThoughtScript," given its particular manifestation and resemblance to rogue representations observed in FND. The ICM provides a useful platform to explain the psychological factors underlying and maintaining this phenomenon.
In a context where it is increasingly understood that symptoms grouped under a single diagnostic label may develop via different psychological processes, the DT-S brings together psychological and neuropsychiatric perspectives to conceptualise a phenomenon often classed as a delusion. The identification and proposed conceptualisation of DT-S stresses the need to continue developing multi-level phenomenological approaches to define a variety of symptoms traditionally grouped under the wider concept of "delusion."
The ICM was developed to integrate existing cognitive models with the concept of dissociative compartmentalisation. Drawing on this model, we developed a successful psychological intervention that places less emphasis on challenging delusional content and focuses more on dismantling dissociation and underlying affective factors associated with the activation and maintenance of the fixed belief. The application of this model to DT-S may enhance outcomes in cases where existing evidence-based psychological techniques for psychosis have proved unsuccessful. It may also help understand the formation and expression of fixed beliefs in the absence of other psychiatric phenomena, providing a useful conceptual platform for future behavioural and cognitive research on DDs. However, further testing of this model, ideally in experimental contexts and including more patients with similar manifestations, is required before implementing it widely.
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